O objetivo principal deste artigo é esclarecer como Brentano define a relação entre (a) o conhecimento de nossos próprios fenômenos de consciência e (b) o conhecimento de fenômenos de consciência de outros sujeitos. Por um lado, Brentano argumenta, seguindo a tradição moderna, que o conhecimento dos próprios atos mentais é absolutamente fundamental. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, ele quer mostrar com sua Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico uma clara alternativa ao introspeccionismo. Mostraremos como Brentano busca unir estes dois objetivos e (...) como ele também aderiu a esta linha em sua Psicologia Descritiva. Sua psicologia como um todo pode, portanto, ser entendida como um apelo ao pluralismo epistemológico. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that culture plays a pivotal role for understanding Nietzsche’s own normative commitments. My argument develops as follows: Section 2 shows that Nietzsche advances an ideal of self-cultivation (Bildung) which is derived from the existential role of culture, elevating a peculiar concept of artistic creativity to ground his perfectionist understanding of value. Section 3 traces Nietzsche’s image of Goethe as exemplar of creative excellence. I contend that Nietzsche portrays Goethe as a male genius, rendering his concept (...) of self-cultivation entrenched in the cultural imagery of his time. The fin de siècle was obsessed with the image of genius as well as the relationship of creativity and gender. Moreover, as towering figure of German culture after the founding of the German Empire in 1871, Goethe was a frequent example of creative genius. Section 4 deepens the discussion of the role of gender in Nietzsche’s concept of creativity, exploring how the essentialist gender psychology of his mature works curtails the creative potential of women and explains his dismissal of feminism. (shrink)

Papers from a conference held March 2010, Zug, Switzerland.

Bd. 1: Grundlegung der Ästhetik. Bd. 2: Die ästhetischen Grundgestalten. Bd. 3: Kunstphilosophie und Metaphysik der Ästhetik Bd. 1 , XII- 560, Bd. 2 , XX-602 und Bd. 3 : XX-600.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Auf dem Wege zu einer Phänomenologischen Psychologie" verfügbar.

When is it fair that some people are less healthy than others due to their own individual choices and preferences? In this paper, I explore two alternative answers. The first is a luck-egalitarian account that holds people responsible for choices that society could have reasonably expected them to avoid. I argue that this account is indeterminate and go on to sketch an alternative proposal based on Rawls’s idea of a “social division of responsibility.” This latter approach connects the notion of (...) responsibility for health to the social conditions under which health-related behaviour is developed. (shrink)